Well we are now a month into what was supposed to be a 48 hour walkover by Russia into Ukraine and we have no idea what to do next.
A walkover would have been so simple to deal with. The world would have wailed and gnashed their teeth, called Putin nasty names, and imposed some sanctions. The sanctions would have hurt ordinary Russians and made the “Siloviki” – the Powerful even richer.
Instead the Russian army is suffering heavy losses of equipment and personnel and facing even heavier losses when they try to capture Kiev and other cities.
Military experts with experience in city fighting say you need a ten-to-one advantage to capture cities, and you’ll lose a lot of your armor doing so should you be so foolish as to use tanks against apartment buildings.
The Russians could of course simply stand off and shell it into piles of rubble. That I’m told is also problematic. Years ago an old Polish gentleman who’d flown Lancaster bombers for the RAF told me they’d learned rubble is actually easier to defend than intact cities, after they’d destroyed the ancient monastery of Monte Casino.
The obvious problems are:
We can help Ukraine with small arms such as Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger missiles which make life difficult for low-flying aircraft and helicopters. It’s a little late but I’d have suggested doing this more discretely with face-saving deniability.
Putin (outraged): “Where’d those arms come from?”
Biden (shrugs): “Dunno man, must have been the stuff we left behind in Afghanistan.”
Ukraine asked for an air force and Poland was more than willing to give them one, if we’d replace the old Migs they donated with shiny new US airplanes. That, pardon the expression, is not going to fly.
This runs into the problem of Putin’s nukes and the question of where is that “bridge too far”?
At what point might Putin use nukes, and against whom? In this game of nuclear chicken, who blinks first and when?
At this point I’d like to introduce you to Peyton’s Rules for dealing with stand-up aggression, on the theory that aggression between nations is much the same as aggression by street thugs writ large.
(Peyton Quinn is an acquaintance of mine, a former bouncer, teacher, and technical advisor on the movie Roadhouse. Also the inspiration for Sam Eliot’s character.)
Because Putin is a thug with a very large gang. A gang he has increasingly tenuous control over, ready to turn on him at the least sign of weakness.
The rules are: 1) Don’t insult him, 2) Don’t challenge him or accept his challenge, 3) Leave him a face-saving exit.
Number one, that ship has sailed. Maybe we can get past that. Maybe.
Number two, we aren’t going to put boots on the ground in Ukraine, period. The question is, at what point does materiel aid count as accepting that challenge?
Number three, so how do we leave Putin a face-saving exit?
After the Finnish-Soviet War, “The Winter War,” the Soviets gained a small amount of Finnish territory. “Enough to bury the men we lost taking it” as one Russian general described it, and some concessions that did no real harm to Finland.
What is the situation in the ethnic Russian territories in eastern Ukraine? Are they more trouble to keep than to lose, and would Putin be content with a slice of them?
Ukraine could rebuild with massive Western aid, and every city park could have a Russian tank for kids to play on for generations to come.
Is there a way out?
Well we are now a month into what was supposed to be a 48 hour walkover by Russia into Ukraine and we have no idea what to do next.
A walkover would have been so simple to deal with. The world would have wailed and gnashed their teeth, called Putin nasty names, and imposed some sanctions. The sanctions would have hurt ordinary Russians and made the “Siloviki” – the Powerful even richer.
Instead the Russian army is suffering heavy losses of equipment and personnel and facing even heavier losses when they try to capture Kiev and other cities.
Military experts with experience in city fighting say you need a ten-to-one advantage to capture cities, and you’ll lose a lot of your armor doing so should you be so foolish as to use tanks against apartment buildings.
The Russians could of course simply stand off and shell it into piles of rubble. That I’m told is also problematic. Years ago an old Polish gentleman who’d flown Lancaster bombers for the RAF told me they’d learned rubble is actually easier to defend than intact cities, after they’d destroyed the ancient monastery of Monte Casino.
The obvious problems are:
We can help Ukraine with small arms such as Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger missiles which make life difficult for low-flying aircraft and helicopters. It’s a little late but I’d have suggested doing this more discretely with face-saving deniability.
Putin (outraged): “Where’d those arms come from?”
Biden (shrugs): “Dunno man, must have been the stuff we left behind in Afghanistan.”
Ukraine asked for an air force and Poland was more than willing to give them one, if we’d replace the old Migs they donated with shiny new US airplanes. That, pardon the expression, is not going to fly.
This runs into the problem of Putin’s nukes and the question of where is that “bridge too far”?
At what point might Putin use nukes, and against whom? In this game of nuclear chicken, who blinks first and when?
At this point I’d like to introduce you to Peyton’s Rules for dealing with stand-up aggression, on the theory that aggression between nations is much the same as aggression by street thugs writ large.
(Peyton Quinn is an acquaintance of mine, a former bouncer, teacher, and technical advisor on the movie Roadhouse. Also the inspiration for Sam Eliot’s character.)
Because Putin is a thug with a very large gang. A gang he has increasingly tenuous control over, ready to turn on him at the least sign of weakness.
The rules are: 1) Don’t insult him, 2) Don’t challenge him or accept his challenge, 3) Leave him a face-saving exit.
Number one, that ship has sailed. Maybe we can get past that. Maybe.
Number two, we aren’t going to put boots on the ground in Ukraine, period. The question is, at what point does materiel aid count as accepting that challenge?
Number three, so how do we leave Putin a face-saving exit?
After the Finnish-Soviet War, “The Winter War,” the Soviets gained a small amount of Finnish territory. “Enough to bury the men we lost taking it” as one Russian general described it, and some concessions that did no real harm to Finland.
What is the situation in the ethnic Russian territories in eastern Ukraine? Are they more trouble to keep than to lose, and would Putin be content with a slice of them?
Ukraine could rebuild with massive Western aid, and every city park could have a Russian tank for kids to play on for generations to come.